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Mainstream economics tends to take for granted the welfare gains from 
international free trade areas. The Cecchini report which estimated the benefits 
of the single EC market from 1992 disregard the social costs of growth in their 
calculations. This applied especially to the area of environmental issues. Whilst 
we cannot consider all aspects of the environment we focus here upon the area 
of air pollution caused by motor car emissions. A detailed consideration of 
EC policy in this area is conducted. It is concluded that an effective policy in 
this area involves tensions vis-a-vis the anticipated benefits of the freer market 
after 1992. 
I Introduction 
In mainstream economics it is taken for granted that a common market of 
several countries leads to an increase in welfare. The more the market 
expands, the more producers are able to specialize, and economies of scale 
emerge. Producers are able to produce at lower costs. Consumers benefit 
from lower production costs by decreasing prices, which effects an increase 
in prosperity. Moreover, a common market leads towards a diminished 
necessity of government interference with goods and persons crossing the 
borders. This implies lower costs for the authorities, and thereby also for 
tax-paying civilians. 
Based upon these issues, the European Commission has asked a special 
committee under the chairmanship of Paolo Cecchini to estimate the costs 
of the not yet completed common market. In their report the Cecchini group 
has calculated the economic advantages of the abolition of, in particular, 
the nontariff barriers between the member states of the EC.1 Table 1 
contains the most important results from the Cecchini-report. 
1
 Examples of these nontariff barriers are inspections upon entering a country, custom 
formalities, different technical norms and standards, protectionists practices in government 
procurement, state monopolies of a commercial character, government subsidies. 
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Table 1 The most important economic results from the Cecchini report. 
Growth of production (in % of GNP) 4.5 
Decrease in price level of consumption (in %) 6.1 
Decrease of governmental deficit (in % of GNP) 2.2 
Increase of employment in mln |obs 1.8 
Decrease of unemployment (in %-points) 1.5 
Source: Cecchini report, 1988: 151-83 . 
The abolition of the nontariff barriers would yield a noninflatory increase 
in production of 4.5% of the GNP of the EC. This production increase could 
rise to 7.5% if the decrease of the governmental deficits (2.2% of GNP) are 
used for tax reductions and additional governmental investments. More-
over, unemployment in the EC would decrease by 1.5 percentage points. 
The optimistic calculations in the Cecchini report have been criticized 
from different angles.2 On the whole the picture that the commission pre-
sents of the completion of the common market is felt to be too optimistic. 
Institutional and cultural obstructions to the integration of Europe are 
minimized. Furthermore, the results of the calculations should be inter-
preted as potential rather than probable improvements in the economy. 
Although such comments do in some degree temper the euphoria initially 
caused by the Cecchini report, the general conviction is still that completion 
of the common market will yield substantial economic advantages, i.e., a 
substantial increase of production. 
However, an increase of production not only diminishes scarcity, but will 
also create new scarcity, as recent history clearly demonstrates. Fresh air, 
clean water, a well functioning soil, quietness, variety of landscapes and the 
availability of fossil fuels and minerals have become very scarce goods as 
a consequence of the continuous increase in production. Additional produc-
tion growth as a result of the completion of the common market, as inter-
preted and predicted in the Cecchini report, would also lead to increasing 
environmental deterioration. 
On the other hand, the abatement of emissions of polluting substances, 
especially to air and water, is often frustrated by lack of international 
co-ordination. Problems such as acidification of the environment and 
poisoning of rivers and oceans will go on as long as individual countries can 
abdicate the environmental effects of their emissions to other countries. 
Theoretically, completion of the European common market in 1992 could 
offer a great opportunity to start what could be called a European Environ-
mental Policy to abate, especially, continental environmental problems 
(such as acidification) and pollution that crosses borders (such as pollution 
of rivers and the North Sea). It is questionable, however, whether this oppor-
tunity for European integration will be utilized. For in official reports, like 
2
 See e.g., Centre for Business Strategy (1989) and Central Planning Bureau (1989). 
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the one of the Cecchini group, and at the European summits of government 
leaders, integration with respect to hot environmental issues is not at stake. 
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the impact of 
the completion of the EC common market for all environmental issues. 
Instead, this article focuses on air pollution by motorcars, and especially the 
emissions of NOx and C02 contribute substantially to two serious environ-
mental problems on a continental and on a global scale: acidification and 
the greenhouse effect. Of these two acidification is seen as the most urgent, 
and as posing the most severe threat to man and the environment. Although 
acidification as an environmental problem is much older, it did not get much 
attention from the general public and from politicians until after the 
discovery at the beginning of the 1980s that, especially in central Europe, 
forests are dying on a large scale due to the emission of the acidifying sub-
stances S02, NOx and NHX. As will be shown in Section III, the resulting 
European political agenda concerning air pollution caused by motorcars was 
mainly structured by the problem of acidification. Indeed, the greenhouse 
effect was known by the beginning of the 1980s, but acidification has been 
on the international agenda much longer. Nonetheless, it was only at the end 
of the 1980s that countries realized more and more that effective measures 
would have to be taken in the short run. Obviously, there was a time lag 
between the moment of awareness of the problem and the moment the first 
measures were taken. Thus, at first the greenhouse effect was pushed into 
the background. 
Acidification is a continental problem, as is shown by the fact that by 
far the greater part of the acidifying deposition in a given country originates 
from abroad. Obviously, the abatement of the emission of acidifying 
substances could be organized most effectively and most efficiently on a 
European level. But despite the general concern about acidification, this 
abatement is being realized only slowly and with great difficulties. The most 
striking example in this respect is the attempt to reduce the NO„ emissions 
by motorcars. Over the past few years many meetings of the Council of 
Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament have 
been spent on the problem of how to reduce NOx emissions by motorcars. 
So far the effects of these meetings on the environment have been negligible. 
In fact, NOx emissions by motorcars have increased. Without a strict 
European environmental policy a further increase will be inevitable after the 
completion of the common market, especially if we realize that the use of 
cars is increasing morethan proportionally in relation to production growth. 
The aim of this article is to unravel the complex of forces at work in the 
European decision-making process, some of which hinder and others of 
which further the abatement of air pollution by motorcars. We will distin-
guish three aspects of the problem. First, what and who in Europe determine 
the goals of emission abatement? Why was the choice made to reduce NOx 
emissions, and to disregard the need to reduce C02 emissions? In this 
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respect it was important to know how the choice was presented between a 
lean-mixture engine (an example of process-integrated technology) or the 
catalyser (an example of add-on technology). The considerations that led to 
the decision to promote the introduction of the catalyser are dealt with in 
Section III. A complicating factor is the change made in the European 
Community's decision-making process in 1987. The potential this has for the 
possibilities of reducing NOx emissions by motorcars will be dealt with in 
Section II. Obviously, the choice for the one or the other technology of 
NOx reduction is closely related to specific societal interests. There are at 
least three interests into play here: the interest of a sound environmental 
quality, the (differing) interests of the European motorcar industry and its 
consumers, and the interests of other emittents of acidifying substances, 
such as refineries, power plants and farms. In this paper the role played by 
other acidifying sectors is only touched on. The aspects of goals, interests 
and formal decision rules will be brought together in Section IV, which 
describes the most important historical events regarding the attempts on the 
European Community level to reduce the NO„ emissions by motorcars. In 
Section V concluding remarks are made with respect to the question of 
whether the completion of the EC in 1992 will offer better or worse 
opportunities to abate NOx emissions by motorcars. 
II The EEC decision-making process 
As a result of the completion of the common market even economies of scale 
have to be calibrated. Otherwise consumers - buying quantitative gains with 
qualitative losses - could find the scales falling from their eyes. But the 
setting of the scales is a political process. This was realized from the 
beginning, as a major part of the effort to establish the common market was 
the decision making on common standards and common policies.3 The 
question remains of whether the political machinery set up by the EEC 
Treaty was fitted to the tasks that have to be performed. For the first 30 
years the answer is negative, not because the blueprint given in the treaty 
was wrong, but because the member states did not live up to the obligations 
they so solemny accepted upon signing. Roughly speaking the treaty 
envisaged decision making by majority voting in the areas of the EEC's 
exclusive authority. However, common standards were to be achieved by 
unanimity through the process of harmonization: the approximation of such 
provisions laid down by national law, regulation or administrative action 
in member states as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market. 
In practice the distinction between majority voting and unanimity was 
3
 Examples of common standards are harmonization of phytosanitary measures and standards. 
The best known common policy is the Common Agricultural Policy. 
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lost, as all decisions were made unanimously. This turned out to be an 
excellent procedure for not reaching any decision at all, as compromises 
satisfying the six, nine, 10 and later 12 national bureaucracies and the one 
EEC bureaucracy, could be frustrated by any one of them saying no. The 
EEC habit of nondecisions took one of two forms: either nothing was done 
at all, or unyielding points of view were glossed over by vague or contra-
dictory legal texts. Public decision making became a paradise for private 
lobby activities: you only have to succeed in one of 13 capitals to successfully 
ward off any unwanted EEC regulation, or harmonization of national 
standards. Thus leaving the field open for different national regulations and 
the protectionism that may be enshrined in them. 
This gave rise to an arduous process of testing whether these national 
standards could be allowed to infringe the free movement of goods normally 
required in a common market. In order to do so these national standards 
had to fulfill the requirements of article 36 which did not preclude prohibi-
tions or restrictions on imports, exports, or goods in transit justified on 
grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection 
of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protec-
tion of industrial and commercial property. In the litigation before the Court 
of Justice these grounds were expanded by the 'rule of reason', stating that 
as long as the decision-making process was stagnated on the EEC level, it 
was reasonable to accept national divergence. 
Another factor weakening the EC capacity to set up an effective policy 
is the so-called democratic gap, pointing to the fact that contrary to west 
European tradition, law making in the EEC is not done by the repre-
sentatives of the people, but by representatives of national governments 
meeting in the Council of Ministers and acting on the advice of the EEC 
Commission. This democratic gap severely hampers public debate about 
possible measures to be taken, as there is no really relevant parliamentary 
debate, and decisions on EEC regulations and guidelines are shrouded in the 
secrecy of the Council. 
The European Parliament's frustration about its merely advisory capacity, 
and the frustration of major industries about the continued fragmentation 
of the common market into national markets, combined in a drive to change 
the treaty. The result of this process left the European Parliament somewhat 
short-changed: the political solution of the European Union is not to be 
found in the additions to the old treaty. The advocates of the real common 
market appear to have carried the day, as the original goals were restated, 
this time under the catchword of the internal market. Majority voting was 
once again adhered to, and for the first time extended to the harmonization 
process. The political negotiation process set up for harmonization under 
article 100 (requiring unanimity) was derogated by article 100A which 
requires a qualified majority for the adoption of measures necessary for the 
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internal market. Although the adherents of the completion of the internal 
market may have carried the day, this might by no means be enduring, as 
exemption from article 36 was built into the decision-making procedure, 
allowing a member state to deviate from the majority. This might make 
possible the differentiated integration advocated by Hey and Jahns-Böhm 
(1989). 
Still the enhanced status of majority voting made the democratic gap more 
painful. Therefore a new co-operation procedure was written into the treaty, 
binding the law-making Council of Ministers to the European Parliament 
in a delicate procedure. The outcome of this procedure can be that a 
qualified majority in the council, acting in accordance with the commission, 
can give an absolute majority in the European Parliament the opportunity 
to force a majority decision on the council. This is so because amendments 
made by parliament, and accepted by the commission, can only be amended 
by the council if it acts with unanimity. A lobby now needs one member state 
acting in accordance with the commission and the absolute majority in 
parliament, to enact the latter's wishes. Put in an other way, a negative lobby 
has to be successful with either the commission, the majority in parliament 
or all 12 national capitals in order to ward off an unwanted regulation or 
guideline. 
The new co-operation procedure breaking the national veto power, and 
the enhanced concern for the environment written into the treaty, paved the 
way for decision making on the reduction of NOx emissions. 
Ill The international agenda 
The development of goals to reduce the NO, emissions of motor cars is not 
only affected by European decision procedures, flawed or not. Developing 
emission reduction goals and subsequently emission standards on EC level 
is even more determined by the extent to which acidification is perceived as 
a serious problem and as a problem that can only be handled in an inter-
national context. 
Roughly speaking, 50% of the acidification in Europe is due to SO, 
emissions, 20% is due to NHX emissions and 30% is due to NOx emissions. 
Traffic is by far the most important emittent of NOx. Moreover, the share 
of traffic in acidification has sharply increased in the last 20 years and will 
further increase in the near future because of: 1) the reduction of S02 
emissions of refineries and power plants; and 2) the continuously increasing 
number and use of cars in Europe. 
Already in the 1960s there was a lot of knowledge concerning the damag-
ing effect of SO,, NOx and NHX on materials (e.g., erosion of buildings, 
corrosion of metals, deterioration of cultural goods like paintings and 
books), on public health (irritation of the eyes and the conspiratory tract) 
and on nature (distortion of oligotrophic ecosystems). Unfortunately, the 
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dying of forests on a large scale, first noticed in 1980 in central Europe, was 
needed to make it clear that 'acid rain' has extensive ecological consequences 
and to put acidification as a problem on the international political agenda. 
Before 1980, policies directed against the emission of acidifying sub-
stances were primarily national ones.4 In this line of thought, air pollution 
was a national phenomenon and it seemed obvious that national measures 
should be taken against it. One of the methods employed most, was the 
construction of tall factory chimneys, as a result of which pollution in urban 
areas decreased considerably. This created the idea that effective measures 
were being taken. 
In the course of the 1960s, Sweden was increasingly confronted with the 
occurrence of acidification in its lakes. According to Sweden these problems 
were caused by emissions of sulphur oxides elsewhere in Europe. Such 
an allegation did not automatically lead to restrictive measures in S02 
emitting countries. It became evident that it is not easy to get these problems 
on the international agenda. In 1969 and 1972 the matter was brought up 
by Sweden for discussion on OECD and UN level. 
In 1972 the OECD started an investigation of the transnational character 
of air pollution. The results confirmed the outcome of the Swedish investi-
gations (OECD, 1977). This study concluded that favourable effects of 
emission-restrictive measures in a given country occur only partially on its 
own territory, while the rest occurs abroad. This means that it does not seem 
to pay for a single country to take measures. An international approach is 
needed. 
In 1978 there was a follow up to the OECD investigation. Within the 
framework of the Economic Commission of Europe the so-called EMEP-
programme was set up: a co-operative programme for the monitoring 
and evaluation of long-range transmission of air pollutants in Europe. 
Twenty-six countries participated in this programme, among them the 
eastern European countries. The first phase of this investigation concerned 
the origin of the sulphur deposition in Europe over the year 1980. The results 
of this investigation were spectacular. In some countries the sulphur deposi-
tion originates for a very large part from abroad. This percentage was 92 
for Norway, 82 for Sweden, 77 for The Netherlands and 90 for Switzerland. 
For the UK this percentage is only 20. It was established for well over 
three-fourths of the European countries that half or more of the sulphur 
deposition originates from abroad (ECE-EMEP, 1981). In the second phase 
of the research programme the transnational character of NOx pollution 
was investigated. In addition to research, efforts were made to achieve a 
joint reduction of emission. 
4
 At first attention was focused on the emission of S02. This is connected with the chemical 
properties of S02, which give S02 a larger effect on acidification than NOx. Originally S02 
had a larger share in the acidifying substances, but after 1960 emission of NOx by motor cars 
increased much more sharply. 
Frank Dietz, Jan van der Straaten and Menno van der Velde 69 
As we have seen attention has only recently been focused on the emission 
of NOx. Furthermore, it has only just become clear that the sharp increase 
of the emission by traffic is a big threat to the forests in western and central 
Europe. The dying of forests first occurred in the FRG, around 1980. 
Initially there was no clear insight into its causes. It took several years until 
it was firmly established that acid rain damages the roots and stomas on 
leaves or needles in such a way that trees wither. In the course of the 1980s 
this phenomenon was also found elsewhere in Europe on a large scale. 
According to an investigation of the Economic Commission for Europe, the 
forests in Italy have been affected for 15%; for 31% in France and for 56% 
in the UK. In The Netherlands the percentage is 57 and in the FRG 52 
(Termeer, 1989). Although the percentage of damaged forests in the UK is 
approximately as high as in the FRG, the surface area of forests in the latter 
country is much larger. The value attached to forests in the FRG is tradi-
tionally much higher as well. Furthermore, in the low mountain ranges and 
the northern edge of the Alps, there is great concern about more erosion 
on the slopes of the mountains after the trees disappear. It was self-evident 
that the FRG would take the initiative in the European Community and 
advocate international measures to be taken against NO„ emission by 
motor cars. 
In the first instance, the discussion was mainly about the nature of the 
measures. The UK took the view that a so-called lean-mixture engine would 
be the most desirable solution. In such an engine, fuel is burnt in a special 
way, resulting in less heat from combustion. The lower temperatures lead 
to a lower emission of CO, and NOx. With such an engine a reduction of 
NOx by 70% is possible. The fuel consumption in this engine is lower than 
in a regular engine because of the more effective combustion. However, this 
engine is still in an experimental phase. 
The FRG preferred the installation of catalysers, because this can result 
in a reduction of NOx by 90%. If one wants the reduction of NO„ to meet 
the strictest requirements, the installment of a catalyser is the only solution. 
However, when a catalyser is used, petrol consumption increases by 10 to 
20%, as a result of which C02 emission also increases. In the European 
Community, the level of the NOx standard has been discussed at great 
length. Once the decision was made in favour of strict standards, the choice 
of the catalyser was also made. A further development of a lean-mixture 
engine was given a low profile. 
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IV The policy of the European Community with regard to the reduction 
of the emission of NO' 
1 The situation of the car market in Europe 
The policy of the European Community can only be judged on its merits 
when the different positions of car-producing countries are considered. The 
West German car industry produces more cars with heavy engines than the 
UK, French and Italian car industries do. Moreover, the competition force 
of the car industry differs from country to country. The position of the West 
German car industry is considered to be strong, while the UK car industry 
is generally considered to be the most outdated in Europe. The Italian and 
the French car industries take up a middle position. The Japanese car 
industry has been able to secure a strong position in different European 
countries. In the UK and France in particular there is great concern about 
competition from the FRG and Japan. 
Against this background it is feared in particular that the installation of 
a catalyser will raise the price of small cars relatively more than the price 
of the bigger (West German) cars. Part of the small car market may be lost 
because of this price rise. A large-scale loss of employment is a powerful 
political argument which feeds on the memories of the phasing out of the 
metal industry and the textile industry, which used to be important branches 
of industry. A similar development in other traditional branches, such as 
the car industry, is feared. In EC decision making, countries with important 
manufacturers of small cars tended to weaken or postpone decisions on 
NOx emission. 
2 The negotiations in the European Community 
In the FRG, both the interests of the car industry, which is an important 
employer, and the importance of the forests, which cover almost 30% of 
the land, are at stake. A high value is set on both of these. In 1984 the home 
secretary put forward a plan to equip all cars with a catalyser as of 1 January 
1986. This plan was defeated in the Bundesrat (Strabbing, 1984a). A 
compromise was reached by stipulating that between 1 January 1986 and 1 
January 1988 a 'clean' car would be introduced step-by-step. Also, the West 
German government had to put pressure on the EC to introduce 'clean' cars 
in the EC on the same time schedule. 
The European Commission, however, drew up a plan according to which 
the catalyser car would be introduced gradually between 1989 and 1995. This 
slow progress was found unacceptable in the FRG. The Minister for 
Economic Affairs was told to exert pressure in Brussels to hasten the pro-
cedure. The Bundesrat also insisted that the FRG should bring the measure 
into force on its own, if the European Community would not agree to the 
5
 This section was written on the basis of Dutch newspaper articles. 
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date of 1 January 1988 (Strabbing, 1984a). The West German initiative did 
not lead to quick results in the European Community: opposition from the 
UK and France, in particular, was too fierce. 
Discussion in the EC centred around three issues: 
1) Which standards were to be set, and would they be differentiated accord-
ing to engine capacity? 
2) According to which timetable would these standards be introduced? 
3) Were tax benefits to be allowed in the intermediary period to stimulate 
the voluntary buying of a more costly catalyser car as long as the 
catalyser was not imposed? 
To break the deadlock between the West German position and the UK-
French opposition, the Dutch minister tried to find a compromise solution. 
Early in 1985 he put forward a plan to restrict the emissions of motor cars 
step-by-step. Motor cars with an engine capacity of more than two litres had 
to produce less nitrogen oxides in 1989. A year later medium-sized cars of 
1100 to 2000 cc should follow suit and small cars should change between 
1992 and 1995. The French minister agreed to this plan in general, although 
some adjustments had to be made. This compromise proposal did not break 
the deadlock. The FRG wanted to apply strict US standards to every motor 
car, whereas the UK, in particular, wished to apply a more flexible standard 
for small cars. 
A compromise was possible only if the question of the standards was 
postponed; they would be fixed later. The following timetable was agreed 
upon on 20 March 1985. As of 1 October 1988 every new model with an 
engine capacity of over two litres would be dealt with. A year later, this 
requirement would come into force for every new car of this size. Two years 
later the same would apply to all new models with an engine capacity of 
between 1400 and 2000 cc. Four years later it would apply to every car in 
this category. A separate arrangement applies to cars under 1400 cc. In the 
early part of the 1990s they have to be somewhat more clean. In 1987 further 
decisions would be taken, while the standards for these cars, which in the 
EC have as get to be settled, will come into force in 1993-94. As of 1 July 
1985, countries may grant fiscal advantages in order to make the purchase 
of a 'clean' car more attractive. Finally, it was decided that as of October 
1989 lead-free petrol must be for sale all over Europe. 
This compromise was not even remotely in accordance with the original 
West German plans. Since the fleet of cars will be replaced in approximately 
10 years, this compromise means that in the year 2004 the last 'dirty' small 
car will disappear from the roads in the European Community. The environ-
mental movement denounced the compromise (Luyten, 1985). 
Despite all the compromises and the marathon sessions, it soon became 
apparent that neither the UK nor France intended to give the watered-down 
compromise an opportunity to succeed. The FRG announced that a favour-
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able fiscal measure for 'clean' cars would be brought into force on 1 July 
1985. At that moment the UK made a fuss and stated that the FRG was 
moving too fast. If the FRG persisted, further consultations on the 
standards would be subjected to great pressure. The FRG announced that, 
if need be, it would take unilateral measures (Klein, 1985d). 
Early in June the proposals which the European Commission would take 
to the Council of Ministers on 25 June 1985 were published. More detailed 
standards were involved here. The proposal of the commission with regard 
to cars with an engine capacity of more than two litres, was roughly in 
conformity with the strict US standards. The FRG had made a proposal 
regarding medium-sized cars of 2.5 grammes nitrogen oxide per test.6 The 
UK proposed 6.5 grammes. The compromise of the European Commission 
was 4.0 grammes. Again the compromise was quite remote from the original 
FRG aim. The European Environment Bureau stated: 'First we were up 
against watered-down target dates, now the Commission supplied us with 
matching watered-down standards' (Klein, 1985e). 
The Council of Ministers of 25 June had difficulty in reaching an accept-
able decision. After long meetings and much squabbling a flexible European 
standard was reached (Klein, 1985e). 
On 25 November 1988 a meeting of the EC ministers for the environment 
was held. They came to an interim agreement in which flexible European 
standards were set up. The standard adopted was the one finally suggested 
by the UK, France and Italy, namely: eight grammes nitrogen oxide per test 
(Aarden and Garschagen, 1989). Greece, The Netherlands and Denmark 
voted against these standards. 
3 The fiscal advantage 
Before the date on which the first car was going to drive with a catalyser, 
the fiscal settlement for this needed to become effective. The Netherlands 
finally did not go beyond the original plans of March 1985, since these had 
been approved in principle by the Council of Ministers. The special 
consumer tax for cars was rearranged. A compensation of 1700 guilders (1 
US $ is 2.0 guilders) is given for cars with an engine capacity of over 1400 cc. 
For cars under 1400 cc this compensation is 850 guilders. Furthermore, the 
price of leaded petrol is 4.5 cents more per litre than the price of lead-free 
petrol. By means of these measures 'clean' driving was thought to be made 
more attractive (Geradts, 1985). 
The Dutch measures would lead to a speedy introduction of 'clean' cars. 
Research had shown that the majority of the Dutch buyers would purchase 
such a car if it was not more expensive than a 'dirty' one. When 'clean' car 
6
 A so-called standard test is meant here, by which, under certain specified circumstances, 
nitrogen emission is measured. 
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are bought voluntarily and en masse, the car fleet will be 'clean' sooner than 
might be expected on the basis of the mandatory data that had been agreed 
upon. 
Late in 1988, the EC commissioner for the environment announced that 
the Dutch fiscal measures were contrary to the rules in the European 
Community with regard to the common market. The matter was going to 
be taken to the European Court of Justice (De Volkskrant, 1988). The Dutch 
Minister disputed the point of view of the commission. The Dutch fiscal 
arrangement does not put a single car manufacturer at a disadvantage, 
because everybody in The Netherlands is free to buy a car with or without 
a catalyser. Every car industry already produces cars with catalysers for 
Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and the USA. Therefore there is no question 
of certain factories being unable to produce cars with catalysers. Moreover, 
nobody and nothing is supported by state subsidy. There is only a financial 
transfer between users of cars with and without a catalyser (De 
Volkskrant, 1988). 
The European Commission and The Netherlands got into a pitched law 
court battle. The commission started to investigate whether or not the fiscal 
advantage given in The Netherlands would distort competition by state aids. 
If so, this would lead to procedures under articles 92 and 93 of the EEC 
Treaty. These procedures have a suspending effect: the Dutch government 
cannot introduce the fiscal measures in the meantime. The Dutch govern-
ment initiated summary proceedings against the commission at the 
European Court of Justice, challenging the commission's authority to apply 
the treaty provisions on state aid in this case. 
During this manoeuvering it turned out that there was not a majority in 
the commission in favour of applying the articles on state aid. At most there 
was willingness to apply articles 30 and 36 of the treaty which deal with the 
free movement of goods. This would not have a suspending effect 
(Garschagen, 1989a). Ultimately, it appeared that disagreement had arisen 
within the commission about the plan to summon The Netherlands at all. 
Some commissioners felt it was not a realistic policy to start a legal procedure 
against a member state because it was taking environmental measures, a few 
months before the European elections. 
4 The 1989 miracle 
As with all miracles there is something unexplained about the sudden 
acceleration in EC decision making after the attempt to block the Dutch 
fiscal stimuli for catalyser cars. The Italian commissioner for the environ-
ment, Ripa di Meana, concluded that the fiscal measures should not be the 
only issue, but also the previously fixed standards, which were experienced 
as being much too watered-down. Before the European parliamentary 
elections, Di Meana wished to put proposals with stricter standards to the 
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vote in the European Parliament. The new co-operation procedure (see 
Section II) plays a part in this. In this new situation, a proposal with regard 
to stricter standards would stand a chance. 
It turned out that he had accurately judged the balance of power in the 
commission. The Netherlands would not be summoned to appear in the 
Court of Justice. That meant that they could carry out their fiscal plans. 
Furthermore, Di Meana reopened the discussion on the standards success-
fully. In April the European Commission proposed to have all cars manu-
factured in Europe comply with the strict US standards, not later than 1 
January 1993. In practice this means that catalysers will be installed. This 
proposal was drastic compared to the compromise that had been reached 
earlier (Garschagen, 1989c). It was hotly debated by France, the UK and 
Italy. Pressure in favour of the proposal was still further increased by the 
FRG, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and Denmark. The European 
parliamentary elections put so much pressure on the meeting of the EC 
ministers for the environment, that none of them would take the respon-
sibility for the failure of an environmental conference. As a result, they not 
only decided to accept the US standards, they even advanced the date by 
which the standards will take effect by six months. 
V Concluding remarks 
The EC 1992 programme is heavily based on the neoclassical theory that free 
international exchange of commodities and production factors will increase 
total production. In estimating the benefits of the completed common 
market (that is evaded costs, in particular the nontarif f barriers) the Cecchini 
committee disregarded the social costs of production growth. Especially the 
fact that the use of energy and the related environmental pollution, which 
both increase more or less proportionally to production growth, could even 
outweigh the benefits of the completed common market. A striking example 
is the use of motor cars, which is increasing more than proportionally to 
production growth. Increasing NO, emissions by motor cars will make the 
problem of acidification worse, while European society is already faced with 
huge social costs at the current level of acidification. Moreover, increasing 
use of motor cars will increase C02 emissions, which contribute to the 
greenhouse effect. Given these effects of production growth that will result 
from the completion of the common market, the question arises as to 
whether agreements can be made on the European level to reduce NOx and 
C02 emissions by motor cars, and, if so, whether the agreed emission 
standards actually contribute to reducing the acidification problem and the 
greenhouse effect. More generally, the existence of substantial external 
diseconomies requires intervention in market processes, especially when the 
external diseconomies can be interpreted as a collective good, as is the case 
with NOx and C02 emissions from motor cars. 
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Originally there were two technical options for reducing environmental 
pollution by motorcars: the lean-mixture engine and the catalyser. The EC 
chose the catalyser because a catalyser reduces NOx emissions up to 90%, 
while a reduction of only 70% can be attained with the lean-mixture engine. 
This choice indicates that acidification was regarded as a far more threating 
problem than the greenhouse effect. By setting aside the lean-mixture 
engine, the opportunity was missed to reduce petrol use by motor cars and 
so to reduce C02 emissions substantially at the cost of a somewhat less far-
reaching reduction of NOs emissions. 
From the beginning the car industries of the UK, France and Italy tried 
simultaneously to postpone decisions which introduced emission standards 
for cars and to weaken the standards that were introduced. Their argument 
concerned the market position. The greater part of the cars produced in these 
countries are small and relatively cheap. When a catalyser is added, the price 
of small cars will rise relatively more than the price of large cars. The car 
industry in the UK, France and Italy feared a decrease in demand as a result 
of this price rise more than the car industry in the FRG. 
At first the car industry succeeded in their strategy of retarding and 
frustrating the set up of effective NOx reduction standards. The possibili-
ties to influence and manipulate political decisions were large, because in 
practice the right of veto was operative at the highest decision level in the 
EC, the Council of Ministers. A well organized lobby, such as that of the 
car industry, can easily succeed, then, because only one or two national 
governments have to be won over to its point of view. Moreover, due to the 
'democratic gap' in EC decision procedures, decisions of the council cannot 
be corrected by the European Parliament. As a consequence, the influence 
of pressure groups is more hidden than it would be if parliament had the 
final word. 
The typical culture in the EC of continuously seeking compromises, 
leaving a lot of room for exceptive clauses and temporary measures, is of 
hardly any use in the case of the reduction of NOx emissions by motor cars. 
The very mobility of the pollutive sources, and the need for a common infra-
structure in the form of lead-free petrol stations, force some sort of common 
decision making. On the one hand, the movement of cars across national 
borders cannot be hampered without interfering with the free movement of 
goods. On the other hand, this mobility excludes the escape from common 
standards available for dealing with nonmobile pollution sources. For 
refineries and power plants disagreement on common standards can be 
hidden behind 'regionally differentiated' standards. 
Despite these difficulties a surprisingly far-reaching decision was taken 
within the short period of the first six months of 1989 concerning the 
introduction of the catalyser. All newly produced European cars should 
comply with the strict US standards no later than 1 January 1993. At first 
sight it is not clear why this breakthrough was possible after years of dead-
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lock. Several events and circumstances offer partial explanations, such as 
the breaking of the unanimity rule, the oncoming European elections, and 
the specific attitude of Commissioner Di Meana. But these events and 
circumstances should be put together logically in order to get a total picture 
of the forces at work in the 1989 breakthrough. 
With respect to the debate of the EC 1992 programme it can generally be 
concluded that the EC level has offered better opportunities to abate NOx 
emissions by motor cars than can be expected on the national level. These 
better opportunities do not result from the abolition of any (nontariff) 
barrier between the member states of the EC. Rather, the set up of common 
standards was made possible by a transfer of authority and a change in the 
decision-making procedure. Decisions of the council no longer require 
unanimity and, although structured in a complicated way, the influence of 
the European Parliament on decisions of the council was enlarged. These 
changes in the decision-making procedure were a necessary condition for the 
rapid change in attitude of the council and the commission during the first 
half of 1989 regarding the introduction of NO„ emission standards for 
motor cars. The initiative of the commission to start proceedings against the 
Dutch government who intended to give catalyser cars a fiscal advantage, 
met with a lot of negative publicity. In the media the commission was 
frequently accused of hampering environmental improvements on the false 
grounds that the Dutch fiscal measure limits competition in the European 
car market. This negative publicity, combined with the oncoming elections 
for the European Parliament in which environmental issues got a lot of 
attention, forced the commission to withdraw the complaint against the 
Dutch government at the European Court and pressed the commission and 
the council to break the existing deadlock concerning the NOx reduction 
standards for motor cars. The political actions of Commissioner Di Meana 
could only be successful in the context of a European Community that had 
just changed the rules of the (decision) game and in which environmental 
problems had rapidly gained the attention of the population and thus of the 
politicians competing with each other in the European elections. So, in our 
view, it was not the enlarged market, but the changes in the legal, political 
and social structure of the EC, that led to the decision to abate NOx 
emissions more effectively. 
Finally, setting up standards and a timetable for the introduction of these 
standards cannot be the last EC decision on this subject. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is obvious that, from an ecological point 
of view, the standards attained are insufficient effectively to abate air 
pollution in general and acid rain in particular. Although the NOx emis-
sions per motor car will decrease, the growth of car use can and will easily 
outweigh this effect. To avoid this, more technical measures could be taken 
e.g., by constructing a package introducing the catalyser for the intermediate 
period, while at the same time the further development of the lean-mixture 
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engine is forced by setting standards and timetables for the reduction of 
petrol use and C02 emission per motor car. However, despite such tech-
nical improvements, only a radical decrease of car use in favour of public 
transport can decrease the air pollution due to transport of passengers and 
cargo to a level that corresponds to the carrying capacity of nature. 
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